Is the Alashan (SEE) Foundation a Model For the One Foundation?

China Development Brief, No. 50 (Summer 2011)

中文 English

Interestingly, the author reserves most of his criticism for two foundations that are well known for supporting grassroots NGOs, even though he admits that the vast majority of Chinese foundations are in an even worse state of affairs. For more balance, this article should be read alongside the articles in our Special Issue on Philanthropy and Civil Society in China which raise a similar set of issues that include: (i) the lack of a professional approach to grantmaking, and even the lack of awareness of the concept of grantmaking, among most Chinese foundations; and (ii) the lack of interest among most Chinese foundations in supporting grassroots NGOs.

If one were to consider June 5, 2004 as the founding of the Alashan SEE Ecological Association and as the official beginning of what later would become the SEE Foundation , then by June 5, 2011 the SEE Foundation was already seven years old. If one considers December 2010 as the date when the One Foundation officially became a public fundraising foundation, then by June 5, 2011, the One Foundation was only 7 months old.1

These two “foundations” both have close connections with the same few people, including Yang Peng, Wang Shi, and Feng Lun. In the vast scope of history, these two organizations have only been around for a very short time. In the context of China’s environmental movement, the two organizations can only be considered as buds beginning to blossom.

In recent years, I have carefully researched the short history of China’s charity sector, as well as the history of charitable organizations around the world. I have found that the single biggest factor determining a NGO’s success has nothing to do with whether it is publicly or privately funded, nor whether its internal structure and funding is transparent. Instead, it has to do with whether the NGO has clear and targeted plan for acquiring and using funds. It is simple: an organization that has developed successfully always has a clear and well thought out purpose, which guarantees its continued competitiveness. An organization that is struggling has nearly always lost focus of its mission. Losing that focus can create internal chaos in the organization, and even in the rest of society.

Everyone knows that foundations are meant to do two things: 1) to act as a sponge and take in as much of society’s excess wealth as possible; and 2) to act as a sprinkler system, taking the extra money and spreading it out to those who need it most.

In October of 2009, Lu Sicheng, who had recently resigned from his position at Greenpeace’s China office, was recruited by then secretary-general of the SEE Foundation, Yang Peng, as a “high-ranking expert.” Lu had worked with Greenpeace for many years and had the reputation of a “professional manager.” He had extensive experience in NGO management, working with the environmental movement, and in public advocacy. After just two to three months, this “high-level expert” had completed the adjustment into this new organization, and Yang Peng resigned from the position of secretary-general, leaving Lu to take over. Six months later Lu had to leave his post due to the illness of his father. Nie Xiaohua, the secretary of Liu Xiaoguang, the first president of SEE foundation, and the CEO of the Beijing Capital Group, took Lu’s place as acting secretary-general. When Nie first arrived, he had stated he would work in the position temporarily for three months. Yet it was not until almost a year later that she finally gave up the position to Liu Xiaogang. Liu is also a person with a special reputation, as she had worked in a charity organization similar to SEE, was a member of the SEE Foundation, and after the organization became privately funded, also became a “donor.”

By following the personnel changes of the secretary-general position we discover that from 2004 to 2008 the institution of the SEE Foundation was not very stable. Whether this was due to the constant turnover at the secretary-general level, or because of the strong democratic nature of the board of directors, this instability also created uncertainty in the organization’s decision-making.2 The organization was running out of sync, like a poorly constructed clock. Sometimes, one entrepreneur would take over the Secretariat and push the organization in a certain direction. Other times, a group of entrepreneurs would come together and override the authority of the Secretariat, taking the organization in a completely different direction.3 For six or seven years, the Secretariat position has experienced instability, as frequent changes created an atmosphere of unease and fatigue.

Highly experienced members of the philanthropic community that rely on entrepreneurs who believe that with wealth comes privilege, discovered for the first time that if an organization lacks a clear direction, whether because of fear, cowardice, or lack of ability, it will be unable to endure the seemingly democratic forces that are in reality unstable. By depending on these entrepreneurs, the organization is doomed to endure the pain brought on by these disorganized actors.((Editor’s Note: the author seems to be making a plea for a democratically-selected board to allow the secretary-general, who was selected because of her professional management abilities, to run the organization without excessive interference.))

Despite the SEE Foundation’s internal struggles, they have always maintained a relatively clear work plan: to find financial support for China’s environmental movement. They have increasingly expressed their willingness to “learn from environmental folk heroes.” There are a few “donors” who have ambitiously attempted to use funds to promote profound goals such as the “formation of a civil society,” and “the exercise of entrepreneurial democracy”. Generally speaking, however, most donors who have been exposed to the SEE Foundation believe that the best way to encourage and support a healthier environmental movement in China is to provide financial support to the heroic, yet poorly funded organizations that are working on the front lines of environmental protection.

If one were to consider the founding of Liaoning-based Saunder’s Gull Conservation Society, of Panjin City on April 20, 1991 as the formal beginning of China’s grass-roots environmental movement, then Chinese environmental NGOs have a 20 year history of development.  4 Over these 20 years, China has seen a surge in the number of heroic environmental NGOs, with the civil society sector accumulating significant experience and accomplishments. When these environmental heroes had the misfortune of running into the SEE Foundation they soon discovered that this organization was transferring its own “learning costs” on to the entire environmental NGO sector. This is to say, every single instance of funding in truth became a process of “sharing the difficulty” (with the NGO being funde). Through the process of working and learning together, everyone fell into an old trap that led to anger and disappointment.

All areas of China’s civil society sector are severely underdeveloped. Nonprofit education, religion, medicine, scientific research, culture, art, charity, and disaster relief sectors are all meager, and all have a strong potential to utilize Chinese societies excess wealth. One can reasonably say that to give funds to any of these sectors is timely and valuable. All of these sectors are in need of strong guidance, and all are worth supporting.

It is therefore unfortunate that this learning cost must be passed on and shared by China’s NGOs. Nearly every government department in China has some sort of grandiose foundation, whose philosophy may be even more confused than the SEE Foundations. There are many examples. A vast majority of workers in these foundations do not have any idea who the most prominent and influential NGO leaders are. Many foundation staff either have a distaste for grant making, or they view potential grantees with hostility. One national environmental foundation to this day claims to do “its own projects,” and just divides up funds among its project officials. Some foundations involved in medical work start projects transporting books. Some poverty relief organizations continue to transfer public donations into government bank accounts. Many foundations are founded with the sole purpose of providing officials with opportunities for promotion, and their funds mostly come from government coffers or private donations that have been coerced through government intimidation. In general, China’s foundations are a poorly organized motley crew that has undertaken all activities under the sun, yet failed in doing the one thing they rightfully should be doing: clearly defining their purpose, which is to provide a clear direction for the public good and wholeheartedly support relevant activities that will allow advances in the public good.

Comparatively speaking, the willingness the SEE Foundation has shown to support grassroots environmental protection deserves respect, and should serve as a model for other private foundations. The SEE Foundation’s public expressions of support and confidence in China’s grass-roots environmental protection institutions should also be emulated by other organizations. Because grass-roots work is a labor of love, if sponsors are suspicious, dislike the goal they are supporting, and sneer at those they sponsor, then it is best for them to not get involved with the work to begin with.

“The One Foundation” is perhaps the organization most likely to have been infected by the SEE Foundation’s style. At the time, the One Foundation’s focus was disaster relief, poverty relief, and aiding less fortunate children. On the surface their goals seemed to be clear, yet within these projects sudden changes would occur, along with small changes in purpose. This may be because a foundation needs a relatively long “learning period” in order to fully mature. Although people who worked with the One Foundation had sufficient experience in the NGO field, when many different forces came together and combined with new societal actors, the process of assimilation was inevitably difficult.

Of course, society must show proper respect for a foundation’s “learning costs.” It takes many years for a person to understand what is in his heart, let alone a private foundation that is entering a period when society is become more diverse and gathering together people of wealth and influence.

One can imagine, the most fundamental reason that Jet Li publicly expressed his disappointment with the One Foundation in 2010 was not just because it was a “special fund” that was dependent on a government-sponsored foundation. (Editor’s Note: The One Foundation was registered in Shanghai as a private foundation, which cannot raise funds publicly. But it did have a “special fund” under the Chinese Red Cross, a GONGO that did have the authority to raise funds publicly. This “special fund” allowed the One Foundation to engage in public fundraising. In September of 2010, Jet Li made the news when he stated that the One Foundation’s three-year contract with the Chinese Red Cross might jeopardize the foundation’s ability to raise funds publicly. His statement was interpreted by many as a sign that the One Foundation might close down unless they were able to register as a public fundraising foundation. Several months later, in January 2011, the One Foundation made news again when it did succeed in registering as a public foundation in Shenzhen where the environment for registering NGOs and foundations has been less restrictive.)  The truth was that he discovered that the whole of China’s NGO community was in the midst of a chaotic period of learning. He hoped to get through this directionless learning period as quickly as possible, but it is not that easy. The start-up capital of the current One Foundation came from five organizations: the One Fund, the Lao Niu Foundation, the Tencent Foundation, the Wanke Foundation, and the Vantone Foundation. Every organization gave seed money of RMB 10 million (US $1.6 million), which when taken together added up to RMB 50 million (US $ 7.9 million). They had already prepared to raise another RMB 50 million to add onto this foundation. (Editor’s Note: The author is using the One Foundation here to make a point about how quickly things are moving in the China foundation world. Foundations are receiving money faster than they know what to do with it. Giving away money is not easy. It requires strong leadership, a clear vision and a professional staff who are versed in the art of effective grant making.)

Getting to the point, foundations, which engage in the “donation business,” belong to the service sector. The will to do the work should come from the organizations receiving the funding, and not from the donors themselves, nor from the donor organizations’ support staff. If the One Foundation used a firm hand to select the direction for its future projects in the same way as the SEE Foundation, and is totally devoted to that direction, then perhaps changing their grant making approach would be the best path to improve their efficiency and thereby receiving industry recognition. If one were to view a private foundation as a marketing company, and the recipient organizations as consumers, then every donation is a process of receiving a consumer evaluation, or an appraisal from society. In China, one rarely finds a private foundation that understands the true meaning of service work. Most staff in donor organizations spend a majority of their time in the office, auditing files, or holding meetings that have little relevance to the main purpose of their organization.

At the very least, the One Foundation has the potential to change the “traditional” donor model – from a model where the donor waits for recipient organizations to apply for projects, to a model where the donor actively identifies and works with the grantee organizations to develop projects,from a model where administrative work would go from 90 percent to 10 percent of the work time. In the current age of increasingly diverse sources of funding, simplifying the process for examining and verifying projects – putting an end to the seemingly endless applications and reports and the dismal process of examining and verifying over and over again – is the most just way of improving efficiency in the project funding process.


  1. Editor’s Note: The One Foundation made headlines when it became the first private (or nonpublic fundraising) foundation to register as a public fundraising foundation in Shenzhen in January of 2011. 

  2. Editor’s Note: SEE is a unique membership association created by a group of entrepreneurs dedicated to environmental protection. These entrepreneurs also sought to run SEE in a democratic manner. Thus the board of directors of both SEE and the SEE Foundation are selected by a general assembly in which SEE’s members have voting rights. For more about SEE’s governance, see the article “The One Foundation and SEE as ‘Shell’ Foundations 

  3. Editor’s Note: the Secretariat is the administrative body of SEE led by the secretary-general which is the equivalent of an executive director. While board members normally have a say in running the organization, it sounds like SEE’s board members sometimes took matters into their own hands. 

  4. Editor’s Note: Environmentalists note that the Saunder’s Gull Conservation Society, not the much better-known Friends of Nature, was China’s first grassroots environmental NGO. 

从“阿拉善”看“壹基金”

冯永峰

中国发展简报2011夏季刊第50卷

 

如 果说2004年6月5日真的算得上阿拉善SEE生态协会也就是后来SEE基金会的正式成立时间,那么到2011年的6月5日,这个基金会已经发展了7年。 如果说2010年12月份的某一天真的是壹基金正式改版成为公募基金会的时间,那么,到2011年6月5日,壹基金算是成立只有7个月左右。

这 两个“基金会”和几个人有比较密切的关系,比如杨鹏、王石、冯仑。两个基金会成立的时间如果真要和历史长河去比对,那么确实是非常短的。如果在中国基金会发展史中论资排辈,也不过是刚刚出土的新笋,旁边至少长着几十株面相老成的高竹。如果要拿中国的民间公益、环保史来参照,那么这两个基金会只能算是刚刚开 蒙的小儿。

这 几年笔者很小心地研究了一下中国的公益小史和世界的基金会小史,大体发现,影响一个基金会发展的,其实不是其性质属于私募还是公募,更不是所谓的基金会自律、财务透明之类的“基础设施”,影响基金会发展的关键条件只有一个,那就是资助目标是否明确,发展得好,很简单,资助目标如针尖一般明确锐利,这样既保 证了其存在的竞争力,又保证了其生长的向心力。而发展得不好,也很简单,就是因为其资助目标像云团一样迷茫随机,而这样随机所引发的骚乱,必然会由机构内部而蔓延至整个行业甚至整个社会系统。

所有的人都知道基金会只做两件事,一是像海绵一样拼命吸取社会的多余财富,不管这财富是以暴风骤雨的形式瞬间聚集,还是以缓慢滋润的形式细水长流。二是像喷灌机一样把钱播撒到最需要钱的土地上。前者是义无返顾地聚钱,后者是义无返顾地花钱。

2009 年10月份,香港人卢思骋刚刚从绿色和平中国办公室离职不久,就被当时的阿拉善生态协会秘书长兼SEE基金会秘书长杨鹏聘请到阿拉善担任“高级专家”。卢思骋在绿色和平工作了很长时间,素有“职业经理人”之称,在NGO机构管理、环保运动、公众倡导等多方面具有非常丰沛的经验。两三个月后,“高级专家”悄然地完成了所有的工作交接,杨鹏辞去了秘书长职位,卢思骋正式接任。半年后,卢思骋以父亲有恙为由,交出了秘书长的职位,由阿拉善生态协会首任会长、首创集团董事长刘晓光的秘书聂晓华代理。聂刚来的时候,说是只代理三个月,可到了快一年的时间之后,2011年5月,她才把这个职位交给了刘小钢。刘小钢也是 身份奇特的人,她此前也在一个类似于公益机构的机构里任职,本身是阿拉善SEE生态协会的会员,协会改为基金会之后,就成了“捐赠人”。

如果顺着秘书长的人事变迁线索回望,其实公众会发现,2004年至2008年,阿拉善也同样很不平静。无论是由经常备受干预的执行层面的秘书处,还是由企业家搭建成的据说里面充满民主议事精神的理事会,都由于大量随机的冲动和干预而让整个机构充满了业务不确定性,整个机构像个乱摆的钟一样东撞西敲。有时候,一个企业家会跳入秘书处,强烈要求把工作目标指向某个领域。有时候,一群企业家会集体合谋,共同替秘书处决定某些领域更加要紧,而当前的领域必须马上推 翻。六七年来,秘书处不得不以疲惫而略带惶恐的心态频繁接应着这此起彼伏的喧哗与骚动。

那些贪慕、信赖企业家会员(捐款人)财大气粗、经验丰富的民间公益人士们,第一次发现,如果能量来源是错乱的时候,如果执行团队无论是出于惶恐还是出于胆怯还是出于无能,没法消解这些表面上最民主实际上最野蛮的能量乱撞的时候,那么,一个基金会就必须持久地忍受这种能量乱流给机体带来的痛苦。

然而,无论内部如何动荡和纷争,阿拉善的工作目标一直是算是比较明确的,就是要坚定不移地资助中国的民间环保事业,而且日益坚定地表态愿意“向民间环保英雄学习”。虽然有些“捐赠人”还雄心勃勃地想通过这个资助,推动“公民社会建设”、“企业家民主训练”等深层次目标,但整体来说,所谓与阿拉善有过沾染的人,都相信,把社会财富有意识地注入民间力量,对那些常年工作在民间环保前线而困于资金匮乏的民间环保英雄们,是最好的支持和鼓励。

如果说1991年4月20日,辽宁盘锦黑嘴鸥保护协会的成立算得上是中国民间环保组织发展的正式开始,那么,民间环保组织在中国算是发展了20年。这20年来,中国涌现了大量的民间环保英雄,也积累了不少的成就和经验。但当这些民间环保英雄,与阿拉善遭遇的时候,他们发现,阿拉善正在把自己的“学习成本”,转移到整个民间环保事业身上;或者说,每一笔资助与被资助的过程,其实都是“痛苦共享”的过程。大家在互相协作、共同学习的过程中,掉入经常会让人陷入愤 怒和失望的牢笼中。

中国所有的民间领域发育都严重不足,民间的教育、宗教、医疗、科研、文化、艺术、公益、慈善、环保、救灾等领域都嗷嗷待哺,都有极强大的吸附和消化社会多余财富的能力。可以说,当前把资金资助给任何一根枝条都是值得的、及时的,都是需要大力引导的,都是值得赞美的。

可惜这学习成本必须由各领域的组织共同消纳。中国几乎每一个政府部门下面都点缀着一个很堂皇的基金会,它们可能比阿拉善、壹基金更加思维混乱。比如绝大多数基金会的工作人员,根本不了解资助领域内的优秀人物。比如很多基金会的工作人员,要么对资助工作满怀厌倦和怀疑,要么对资助对象满怀敌意和恶意。比如环保 领域的一家全国性基金会,居然至今“自己做项目”,居然筹资来的钱要给项目官员“分成”。比如某些明明是医疗类的基金会,却去做起了什么书籍之类的搬运。比如某些扶贫类的基金会,居然要把募集来的民间款项全额打入政府帐号。比如很多的基金会,存在的理由只是给官员作为升降的台阶,其资金大量来自政府拨款或者政府胁迫下的企业捐款。总之,当前中国的基金会,乱相丛生,光怪陆离,干了世界上所有可能干的事,但就是没做其最应当做的业务:以明确和坚定的意志,资助一个明确的民间公共利益方向,尽全力支撑民间公共利益相关事业缓慢壮大。

相 比来说,阿拉善明确资助中国民间环保的意志是值得尊重的,也是值得其他诸多基金会借鉴的。阿拉善所表现出的对中国民间环保机构的信任心和赞美力,也值得其他基金会效仿。因为,民间事业本身是一个充满爱的事业,而资助方如果本身狐疑重重、猜疑不定,蔑视资助目标,嘲讽资助对象,更缺乏到资助领域浸泡、与资助对象“共同成长”的才能,那么,还不如别做这份工作。

“壹 基金”可能最有可能感染阿拉善的风格。当前,壹基金的资助目标是救灾、儿童和扶贫之类,表面上已经非常明确,但其资助目标很可能还会出现突变或者微妙的转型。因为一个基金会在发展过程中总需要有相当长的“学习时间”。尽管参与壹基金的诸多人士,此前已经有了足够长的基金会工作经历,但当各方能量重新拼合, 并与新来的社会能量重组的时候,化合过程总不可能那么顺利。

当然,社会应当充分尊重一个基金会的“学习成本”。一个人定下心性都需要好几十年的时间,何况在这样一个刚刚迈入社会多样化的时代,汇聚了巨量资金和影响力人物的基金会。

可以想像,2010年李连杰在公开场合对“壹基金”表现出来的沮丧和失望,最深沉的原因不是因为其只能挂靠在某个国字头的基金会下面作为“专项基金”,而是他发现,基金会处在一片混乱的学习过程中。他想尽快结束这种不知方向的学习,可哪有那么容易。当前的“壹基金”,启动资本来自五个基金会,包括原壹基金、 老牛基金会、腾讯基金会、万科基金会、万通基金会,每家出资1000万元,全部加在一起是5000万元。在此基础上,还准备再筹集5000万元以上。

说到底,基金会所从事的“资助业务”,属于服务型行业。这个工作的意志力应当来自于其所资助的对象而不是来自于捐款人,或基金会中的“资助工作人员”。如果壹基金已经像阿拉善一样明确了未来一段时间的资助方向,铁了心要往这个方向前进,那么,改变资助工作的方法可能是其提高效率、获得业界认可的最佳途径。如 果我们把基金会当成销售公司,而受资助的对象为购买商品的顾客,那么,每一次资助的过程,都是接受顾客评价、社会评价的过程。在中国,我还很少见到基金会能够理解“服务型工作”的内涵,更多的资助工作人员将过多的时间泡在了办公室内审核文件和某些与主业无关的会议上。

至 少,壹基金要有能力改变当前的“传统”资助方式——将坐等受助方前来申报项目改为上门追着给对方项目;程序性工作占用时间,应当从当前的90%以上改为最多只占10%。在资助来源日益多样化的今天,简化项目审核流程,杜绝冗长的申报、审核、再审核、再再审核以及无穷无尽地修改项目书的煎熬,是提高基金会资助效率的题中应有之义。

(作者系环保NGO达尔问自然求知社的创办人,《光明日报》记者)

Feng Yongfeng is Founder of the environmental NGO, Green Beagle Environmental Institute, and a reporter for the Guangming Daily.

Translated by John Lenhart

Reviewed by Sophie Chadd

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