A Review of Civic Environmentalism in China in 2012

China Development Brief, No.56 (Winter 2012)

中文 English

Some events – even frequently occurring events – may easily make us believe that 2012 was a year of improvement or one with developments different from previous years. Indeed, some quiet changes have taken place, but two major indices of environmental health – a compensation mechanism for victims of environmental disasters and a system for public participation in environmental events – have yet to really be established.

2012 is not the end of the world, but it also does not seem to be a major turning point for the environment. A major change in world events may be very unlikely. We quietly continue in one direction, but, as mere passengers on the train, we do not know our final destination.

Environmental Dialogue: Where Does It End?

In April 2012, Beijing hosted the third annual “Environmental Press Awards,” an award created by those in the news media who believe that non-governmental environmental reports make a difference. This year, a new “Citizen Reporter Prize” (公民记者奖 ) was established. Compared to mainstream journalists who are licensed as correspondent and have a powerful media apparatus on which they can rely, the voices of citizen journalists will have to be heard some other way.

Liu Futang, Wu Zhu, and Zhang Xiang received this award. Liu received the “Best Citizen Reporter Award” for his coverage of Hainan’s water-damaged coconut groves. Wu and Zhang both received an “Outstanding Citizen Reporter Award” as well; Wu, due to his astonishing micro-blog dedicated to protecting the Hoh Xil Nature Preserve (可可西里自然保护区) that led the [beer company] Snow (雪花啤酒) to change the course of its Globe Trekker promotion and avoid passing through the Hoh Xil preserve; and Zhang, for continuing his project of “Filming Beijing’s Sewage Drains” along Beijing’s riverbanks. This project prompted copycats in every part of the country to do the same, creating a popular surge in interest in sewage disposal in rivers.

After the ceremony, Liu was originally booked to do short interviews on Sina Weibo to talk briefly about the difficulties of being a citizen reporter on environmental issues. With advertisements out and preparations mostly complete, Liu suddenly said he had to urgently return to Hainan because of a developing, serious environmental event.

In retrospect, this was the first of China’s four “NIMBY movement” events in 2012. China Guodian Corporation (国电) and Hainan’s provincial government collaborated to build two massive coal burning power plants in Yinggehai County. Citizens in the area, however, were not confident in existing measures to limit contamination from factory pollutants and continued to fight against the plan. On 11 April 2012, they took to the streets in order to open a dialogue with policy makers.

Dialogue, however, is challenging and participants paid a heavy price. Many sustained injuries or were arrested and many policemen trying to “maintain social order” were also injured. Through his micro-blog, sixty-five year-old Liu Futang reported extensively on this incident. The next three environmental incidents of 2012, however, far outstripped even the intense struggle and media coverage seen in Yinggehai.

At the end of June 2012, the listed company HTC (宏达股份) invested in building a large-scale molybdenum-copper smelting plant in Shifang City, (located in Deyang, Sichuan). Shortly after the groundbreaking ceremony at the beginning of July, local residents angrily assembled in opposition to the project, causing its “permanent cancellation” in Shifang City.

By the end of July 2012, the same pattern of events played out in Jiangsu Province. Local residents protested Oji Paper (王子造纸) after they discovered that their sewers discharged into the sea. Although the company and local government both claimed that this project benefited the local environment since the wastewater was discharged in compliance with government standards and discharging the wastewater into the sea was preferable to discharging it into the Yangtze River. The protesters, however, were unmoved by government’s explanations and “occupied” City Hall. In the end the Nantong municipal government announced the “permanent cancellation” of the project.

Similarly, in early October, a villager announced a boycott of the PX project in Ningbo’s Zhenhai District. On the 22nd of that month, nearly 200 villagers made their way through blockaded roads to petition the district government. On that day, the Zhenhai District party committee and government sent out an official written statement promising that 20 village communities within the nearby ecological zone would be transformed and that 16 residences would be built to accommodate those affected by demolition. In the early morning of October 24, the Zhenhai district government issued a building permit to Sinopec (中石化), stating that the project was in compliance with environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements and would operate under strict emissions standards. An amount of 3.6 billion yuan would be invested in environmental safety and villagers nearby would be eligible for relocation. The public, however, had little faith in these promises. By the evening of October 28, the Ningbo Municipal government announced that “Ningbo City and the project investors decided to study their plans and to halt the PX project. Any further progress on the refinery project will be suspended pending further scientific study.

On November 12, 2012, at a news conference for the Communist Party’s 18th Party Congress, Zhou Shengxian, head of the Ministry of Environment Protection stated that “it is normal that economic and social development will to some extent cause environmental problems. Currently, Chinese society is at a sensitive stage regarding the environment. These problems generally have the following characteristics: first is the tendency to build first and secure approvals later; second, improvements have yet to be made to the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process; third, local governments are not entirely capable; fourth, societal risk assessment laws and mechanisms for major projects are still rudimentary.”

Minister Zhou said that four concrete steps will be taken to reduce such incidents in the future: (1) strengthening EIA laws and strictly implementing their provisions; (2) promoting open information by disclosing and subjecting to public supervision all environmental impact assessments and government commitments; (3) expanding public participation; and (4) establishing a mechanism for sound societal risk evaluation to prevent catastrophes.

Minister Zhou stated that central authorities and the State Council have already clearly defined regulations stating that all major construction projects must carry out social risk assessments. In the future, the Ministry of Environment Protection will actively engage relevant departments so as to carry out better social risk assessments.

Actually, these four major events are far from the only environmental conflicts during 2012. There are some cases that have yet to trigger real social conflict, such the “Qiandao Lake Irrigation Project” (千岛湖引水工程) being promoted in Zhejiang to bring drinking water from Qiandao Lake to Hangzhou, this project has been continuously debated on the internet. In addition, Shaanxi is already moving forward on the “Engineering Project to Draw from the Han River to Clean the Wei River” (引汉济渭工程), which is a plan to construct an aqueduct through the Qinling Mountains. The project would take water from the upper reaches of the Han River and bring it to the Wei River to help cleanse pollution from the latter and restore its ecosystem. Cases like these are far from entering the realm of a really substantive “environmental dialogue.” According to some statistics, China’s environmental conflicts are growing by 29% every year.

When the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee’s Standing Committee and the Wenzhou City Party Secretary Chen Derong (陈德荣) inspected the Wenzhou river embankment administration in June 2012, he claimed he wanted the rivers within the city to be “swimmable”. Environmentalists concerned with Wenzhou have expressed a strong willingness to participate in this process, but have not found an effective method for doing so. At the end of October, when Party Secretary Chen inspected Wenzhou’s sandbanks development, he said that the city was currently suffering an unusual shortage of land and that it must consider developing the sandbanks on the city’s periphery. According to environmentalists, however, Wenzhou’s sandbanks are an important resting place for migratory birds and an important habitat for local birds. The environmental costs of development, therefore, should be more closely assessed. Unfortunately, there has been no effective response.

In 2012, after being set aside for a period of time, Chongqing’s Small South China Sea hydroelectric power plant started rumors about plans to relocate local residents. Whether it is the local residents or the environmental organizations monitoring this case, it seems impossible to find a way to engage in a meaningful discussion about this project.

I believe that there will be more public awareness and discussion of major construction projects in 2013. However, this type of discussion is generally similar to “risk control” [seeking to prevent pollution before it happens]. With regard to real incidents of pollution, the magnitude of social conflict generally cannot compare with the four previously mentioned major events. This is an interesting phenomenon – people’s willingness to oppose risks that have not yet happened have grown, but they are still largely willing to accept existing dangers.

Environmental Rescue: A Promising Trend

One noteworthy trend in 2012 was an increase in “grassroots environmental rescue”.

In the past, environmental NGOs dealt with environmental incidents with a relatively simple “relief” approach, either by quietly participating or reporting them to supervision and law enforcement authorities. At the most, they reported to, and sought to work with, media outlets.

Black Panther Wildlife Conservation Station (黑豹野生动物保护站) has been focused on one thing from the very beginning: protecting Beijing Fangshan District’s birds and animals through “grassroots rescue”. Over the years, wearing seemingly ‘official’ camouflage jackets and driving fashionable SUVs, the conservationists lectured in villages, patrolled and monitored for any bird traps or poachers, and immediately called out offenders. As such, they had a good working relationship with the Fangshan District Forestry Police. For a long period of time, scissors in hand, they would cut down and burn netting designed to trap birds. Although the work was difficult, their results have been astonishing, effectively destroying local poachers and bird trappers.

The Black Panther’s style and environmental rescue more generally speaking, however, are relatively rare within China. Many environmental organizations avoid this kind of aid and attempt to pass it onto other organizations or are afraid to speak out on these issues because they are concerned about some unnamed “risks.”

The whole of China is like one giant killing field for wild animals. Huge nets, poisons, batteries, traps, and guns are now the “top predator” of China’s wildlife. Yet hidden on every street and alleyway are “restaurants” that are unadvertised, but actively selling, “game.” Places like Jingganshan’s Red Tourism Center have become known as a place for tourists to eat wild game. In Guangdong, eating wild animals is a part of local tradition. Moreover, throughout the country, shark fins, swallows’ nests, snakes, and frogs are proudly consumed. The world’s wild animals are being consumed by China’s insatiable hunger.

On November 11, when the Tianjin division of Let the Birds Fly (让候鸟飞) went on patrol at Beidagang Reservoir to tear down some clearly visible bird netting, they encountered a bird photography enthusiast. He said he noticed some birds appeared to be poisoned while he was shooting photos of the Oriental White Stork. Upon hearing this, they immediately rushed to the scene and discovered that birds were tragically being poisoned in the wetlands. It turns out that this occurs every year and this occurrence may not have even been the worst.

Next came five to six days and nights of continuous fighting. Through microblogging, many telephone calls, persistent media reports, and the assistance of netizens, the details of Tianjin’s Beidagang Oriental White Stork poisoning became clear. It turns out that some people had constructed a “poison pool” within the wetlands about one to two square meters in size. Fish and shrimp would go into the pools and be exposed to highly toxic pesticides like carbofuran and endosulfan. Then the poisoned fish and shrimp would be released back into the wetlands. Migrating flocks of Whooper Swans, Oriental Storks, Spot-billed Ducks, Eurasian Coots, and other wetland birds that eat the poisoned animals paid a disastrous price when they passed through. At least 22 Oriental White Storks were poisoned along with hundreds of other “sacrificial lambs”.

The work of this small group from “Let the Birds Fly” achieved amazing results. They organized an environmental rescue program made up of volunteers that rescued at least 13 Oriental White Storks, mobilizing all possible social forces to participate in this rescue effort. In addition, older rescue organizations like Blue Sky (蓝天救援队), Jet Li’s One Foundation ( 壹基金救援联盟), Green Rescue Team (绿野救援队), and Haotian Rescue Team 昊天救援队, which used to engage in humanitarian relief, also begun their own environmental rescue efforts. The police, fire department, wildlife conservation stations, veterinarians, and other state-sponsored rescue organizations are also starting to participate in these activities for the first time. Although everyone seems inexperienced, they are cooperating closely and demonstrating a strong ability to learn during rescue operations.

To see nongovernmental environmental rescue take this form is quite tragic. Certainly, one breakthrough is that non-governmental disaster relief organizations have started to ally with nongovernmental organizations In the future, the two sides will undoubtedly cooperate more on environmental rescue work. Secondly, in the event of an “environmental disaster”, those first at the scene will be more proactively aware of necessary on-site rescue and have a greater capacity for mobilizing society, specialized rescue funds, experienced help, and more real world experience that will allow them to develop a practical and robust skill set.

Societal Support: Always Expected, Still Difficult to Achieve

If we say that environmental protection is society “collectively rescuing” the environment from a potential or existing disaster, then the extent of Chinese society’s support for the environment is still unclear. When assistance is not necessary, they express strong commitment to the cause; when assistance is necessary, however, they are completely absent.

From the perspective of environmental victims, legal assistance is the most important type of support. Interestingly, China’s laws are oriented less towards punishing those who create environmental disasters, and more to containing the activities of environmentalists. For example, on July 20, 2012, a sickly Liu Futang was arrested by the Hainan Police for “illegal business operations”. In reality, however, his arrest was for his four months of actively reporting on Hainan’s Yinggehai incident. Similarly, Friends of Nature (自然之友) found that it was not so easy to advocate for the environment when they tried to file a public interest lawsuit in a case of chromium pollution in Yunnan. In 2012, a newly revised Civil Procedure Law (民事诉讼法) was passed and included “legal provisions for relevant organizations” to file public welfare lawsuits. Environmental NGOs filing public welfare lawsuits, however, began to encounter a problem known as “judicial discretion.” Public interest environmental lawyers have found that, in the vast majority of cases, most Social Associations and Civil Non-enterprise Institutions, do not qualify as “relevant organizations,” thererby allowing judges to throw out the case. [Editor’s Note: Social Associations (shehui tuanti) and Civil Non-enterprise Units (minban feiqiye) are the two categories of legally registered nonprofit organizations in China. It should be noted that recent revisions of the Environmental Protection Law have also tried to narrow the scope of organizations qualified to file a public interest environmental lawsuit. In one revision of the law, the All-China Environment Federation, a GONGO established by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, was listed as the only qualified “social organization.” When that revision was criticized, a later revision expanded the number of “qualified organizations” to a mere 13. See the CDB article, “View from the Media: Controversy over the Environmental Public Lawsuit.”]

Similarly, the new Environmental Protection Law submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has eliminated clauses concerning “accrued daily penalties,” disclosure of environmental information to the public, environmental public interest litigation, environmental legislative hearings, and public participation in environmental impact assessments. If such a law was adopted, public participation in environmental protection would become even more difficult.

Regarding disclosure of information, there was distinct progress in policy and legislation during 2012. On October 9, the Ministry of Environmental Protection quietly issued an announcement that the “Regulations on Open Government Information in the People’s Republic of China,” was to have been implemented starting May 1, 2008. Prior to that, on January 30, 2008, the former State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA, 国家环境保护总局) had published a “Circular Regarding Public Requests to Disclose Environmental Impact Assessment Documents for Construction Projects” (Circular [2008] No. 50). Some of the provisions in that Circular were not in accordance with the Open Government Information Regulations and so were to have been abolished. Looking carefully at the 2008 “Circular”, you will find it is a response addressed by SEPA to the Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau. The first opinion in that response states that “relevant Environmental Protection departments, in the middle of examining and approving environmental impact assessments compiled from construction project documents, including environmental impact reports, should not be considered within the scope of government information to be disclosed as specified by the “Environmental Information Disclosure Measure (Trial).” But [after the promulgation of the above Open Government Information regulations], Environmental Protection departments must now truthfully respond to public requests for EIAs on construction projects and provide that information.

On October 30, 2012, the Ministry of Environmental Protection released an “Announcement on Further Strengthening Environmental Protection Information Disclosure Work,” which explicitly requires the “complete implementation of newly revised air quality standards and timely releases of accurate surveillance information.” In accordance with requirements in the “New Standards for First Stage Monitoring of Air Quality,” Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, the Yangtze River Delta, and the Pearl River Delta, as well as other key regions, municipalities, provincial capitals, and 74 cities were to begin monitoring air quality in 2012 and disclosing the information at the end of December. By 2013, 113 Key Environmental Protection Cities and National Environmental Protection Model Cities began such monitoring and disclosure. By the end of 2015 all prefecture-level cities will similarly have to monitor and disclose this information. They will also be improving the platform used to disclose air quality information in accordance with new standards for publishing monitored data.”

By contrast, in 2012, China’s environmental protection foundations did not significantly advance its support of grassroots environmental protection. In fact, some long-standing environmental projects suffered and NGOs began complaining, “foundations, why have you forsaken me?”

These foundation certainly have not meant to cheat people, but their funding process is one that “shows intent but not the will” and even “no intent or will.” This has led to criticism from society, and especially denunciations from those in need. The general understanding is that the funding process of Chinese foundations should have evolved early on from an “approval-type” to a “service-type” model, but a comprehensive look at China’s grassroots foundations in 2012 shows that they still operate more like “arbitrary dictators.” [Editor’s Note: By “grassroots foundations” (caogen jijinhui), the author means foundations that were established by private individuals or companies, as opposed foundations with close government ties.]

Here’s a simple analysis. A reasonable funding process should be based on foundations using their vision to quickly identify needs in the sector in order to fund projects or teams. After quickly gathering resources, the Foundation should determine which projects to fund as soon as possible – including time duration, funding amounts, methods – and, within a month, complete the funding process. This funding model has two important characteristics: first, the foundation will always receive more requests for funding than it can support, and second, the funding process will be short and simple to navigate. Of course, this will test the capacity of the foundation staff and, even more, the foundation’s funding framework.

However, China’s grassroots foundations – already considered the best type of foundations in the country – remain obsessed with and stuck in “project approval” mode. This mode is rife with flaws and its arrogance frustrates many people.

An even more cruel aspect of this funding method is that the “approval system” inevitably produces vicious competition. If you submit a call for funding, hundreds upon thousands of applications will appear overnight. Then, a special examination team will reduce the pile of applications by half in the first round, followed by another 50% reduction by another expert, followed by yet another reduction by half through interviews, followed by close examination by a specialist who yet again cuts the pile in half, followed by a final ruling from another specialists who again cuts the pile in half, and finally followed by a funding team that picks one project from the remaining applicants. This kind of exhausting, morally-bankrupt funding process takes so long that it could be compared to prisoners awaiting trial with a level of cruelty similar to gladiatorial combat in the ring.

If donors are unable to recognize that the recipients of their aid are China’s main environmental protection actors that deserve attention and are unwilling to lurk in the shadows or hide away; if donors are unable to realize the value in the ways that their money is spent and suspect that it is being wasted on a dream, then China’s grassroots foundations can be laid to rest. Instead, China’s environmental NGOs can take advantage of the microblogging era, the age of Taobao and of WeChat on cellphones, and of crowd-sourced funding, by turning to the public for funding.

Of course, the environmental NGO funding system NGOs in China is not just about money, although getting enough funds is still the primary concern. But the rising up of ordinary people in Chinese society, and changes in legal aid, media, government, science and technology, volunteerism, and medical assistance, will perhaps challenge the capacity of environmental NGO staff. From this perspective, the golden era for China’s grassroots environmental campaign is coming although the Chinese way will forever go beyond people’s expectations, and will certainly have its own distinctive Chinese characteristics.


冯永锋 中国发展简报no.56 2012冬季刊





刘福堂、吴柱和张祥获得了这个奖项。刘福堂是“最佳公民记者”,他的成就来源于对海南水椰林破坏的持续报道。而吴柱和张祥是“优秀公民记者”。吴柱是因为 他对可可西里自然保护区做出了惊人的微博卫护行动,直接让雪花啤酒的“勇闯天涯”行动改变了路线,不敢再像预订计划那样穿越可可西里核心区;而张祥持续在 北京清河边“拍摄北京排污口”,引发了全国各地的纷纷效仿,一个拍摄中国排污口的热潮正在形成。


现在回想起来,这是2012年中国“邻避运动”四大事件中的第一起事件。国电和海南省政府配合,要在海南乐东县的莺歌海修建两座大的火力发电厂,莺歌海公 众对这个电厂的污染排放控制能力不放心,于是就持续抵抗之。2012年4月11日,他们纷纷走上街头,试图与项目决策者进行对话。



2012年7月底月份,几乎是同样的模式,江苏启东的王子造纸污水管道排海项目也遭受到了公众的抵制。尽管当地政府和企业一再声称,这样的项目对当地环境 只有益处,排海的废水是达标治理的废水,如果不排海,这些废水也将排入长江,再排放入大海(黄海与东海交界处),但当地公众无论政府怎么样解释,他们直接 “占领”了“市政府大楼”,也直接导致南通市政府出来宣布,这个项目“永久取消”。

2012年10月初开始,陆续有村民,以各种方式,宣布抵制宁波镇海区引进PX项目。10月22日,近200名村民到区政府集体上访,附近公路被围堵。 10月22日,宁波镇海区委、区政府通出了相关书面答复承诺该区将在生态带内保留改造20个村民集居点,在城市规划建设用地及备用地上建设16个集中居住 区,以安置该项目涉及拆迁村民。10月24日凌晨,宁波市镇海区政府对中石化镇海炼化扩建项目作出回应,称其符合环评要求,当地政府称,该项目执行最严格 排放标准,环保投入约36亿元,将对项目附近村民进行搬迁。但公众对这些承诺几乎不作出任何的信任表达。10月28日晚,宁波市政府宣布,“宁波市经与项 目投资方研究决定,坚决不上PX项目;炼化一体化项目前期工作停止推进,再作科学论证。”

2012年11月12日,“党的十八大”的一个新闻招待会上,环境保护部部长周生贤认为,“经济社会发展到一定程度,会出现一些环境问题,这是规律。当 前,中国社会在环境方面正处在敏感时期。从必然性和偶然性上来分析,这些问题大体有以下几种情况:一是未批先建,二是在环境影响评价方面有待进一步改进, 三是所在地政府的执政能力问题,四是有关重大项目社会风险评估的法律不健全、机制不健全.”



其实,2012年远未止发生以上四个重大的环境冲突事件,有一些事件尚未引发真正的社会冲突,比如浙江一直在酝酿和推动的“千岛湖引水工程”,准备把千岛 湖的水引入杭州作为饮用水,这个工程在网络上的讨论声和质疑声一直不断。而陕西已经在紧锣密鼓地推进的“引汉济渭工程”,要打通秦岭,修建一条“过水隧 道”,把汉江上游的水引到渭河,帮助清理污染,帮助恢复河道生态。而像这样的事件都远未进入到真正意义上的“环境对话”的层面。按照所谓的统计,中国环境 冲突事件以每年29%以上的速度在递增.

2012年6月份,浙江省委常委、温州市委书记陈德荣视察温州塘河治理时说,要让温州的市内河道能够“游泳”。关注温州的环保人士表示出了强烈的参与的意 愿,但尚未形成有效潮流。而在10月底,陈德荣视察温州滩涂开发时说,温州现在非常缺乏土地,必须抓紧开发周边的滩涂。而在环保人士看来,温州的滩涂是候 鸟迁徙的重要加油站,是留鸟平时重要的栖息地,这些地方的开发的环境代价,应当有更好的评估,可惜,尚未听到有效的回应。


相信2013年会有更多的公众对重大建设项目表达自己的意愿,不过,这种对话属于“风险防控”,而对于真正发生污染的事件,社会冲突的量级多半无法与以上 的四个大事件相比。这也是一个很有意思的现象——人们对尚未发生的危险抵抗的力度加强了,而对于已经发生的危险,则仍旧靠忍受来消解。




黑豹野生动物保护站一直在做的一件事,就是对北京房山区的鸟类和动物保护开展“民间救援”,多年以来,他们穿着非常“正派”的工作装,开着颇为时髦的越野 车,平时不是到村里做宣讲,就是沿着各条线路做巡护和监测,遇上捕鸟的人,他们会马上举报——因为他们与房山区的林业公安,已经形成了良好的互动机制。在 更多的时候,他们手持剪刀,有力而坚定地剪断了一张张的鸟网,然后将这些网,付之一炬。工作虽然艰辛,但成果却也惊人,有效地压制了当地的偷猎、捕鸟的恶 习。


几乎全中国都是野生动物的杀戮场,大网、毒药、电瓶、夹子和枪支,是中国当前野生动物的“致命天敌”,而潜藏在生活各条街巷的一个个“餐馆”,在不事声张 但又主动积极地销售着这些“野味”。像井冈山这样的红色旅游集散地,成了游客吃野味的上佳场所;而像广东这样的有着食用野生动物传统的地方,像全国各地以 食用鱼翅、燕窝、蛇蛙为荣的地方,全世界的野生动物都在填补着中国人贪婪的嘴巴。

2012年11月11日,“让候鸟飞天津小分队”在天津北大港巡护时,拆除了一些他们随眼可见的鸟网,这时候,他们遇上了一个鸟类摄影爱好者。他说,他在 拍摄东方白鹳时,发现有些鸟类出现了疑似中毒的症状。听到这个消息,他们马上赶到现场,发现,湿地正在上演惨烈的毒杀鸟类的事件——这个事件其实以前每年 都在发生,今年未必最为严重。

接下来的就是连续五六昼夜的奋战,通过微博发力,通过举报电话的大量打通,通过媒体的持续报道,通过网友齐声协力的呼吁,天津北大港东方白鹳中毒事件慢慢 地清晰起来。原来,这是一些人通过在湿地里建造封闭的“毒池”,毒池一两个平方米左右,把鱼虾放进去后,再投以剧毒的农药——克百威、硫丹等,将这些鱼虾 毒死,然后再投放到湿地里。迁徙过来的大天鹅、东方白鹳、斑嘴鸭、白骨顶等靠鱼类为生的湿地鸟类,在取食这些鱼虾之时,付出了惨重的代价。至少22只东方 白鹳被毒死,上百只的其他水鸟“殉葬”。

“让候鸟飞”小分队的工作成果也算出色,他们发起的环境救援,在所有参与者的帮助下,救治了至少13只的东方白鹳,发动了全社会所有可能的力量参与了这次民间环境救援。而“蓝天救援队”、“壹基金救援联盟”、“绿野救援队”、“昊天救援队”这样的过去志在野外救人的团体,也开始初步涉足了环境救援领域。而 警察、消防队、野保站、兽医等“国有”各类救援体系,也几乎是初次参与。大家都显得经验不足,但大家都在救援中表现出了强大的合作能力和学习能力。

民间环境救援以这样的形式全场,颇为悲壮。当然,直接的突破一是与民间灾难救援结拜了兄弟,今后双方必将联手做更多的环境救援工作;二是在遭遇“环境灾 难”时,“第一发现者”有了更加主动的现场解救意识,有了更强大的社会动员能力,专项的救助基金将会出现,救助的经验也将有更多实用的示范案例,会形成相对实用的成熟工具包。



对于环境受害者来说,最重要的支援当然是法律支援。有意思的是,中国的法律不会想着办法去对环境伤害者进行惩处,反而会想着办法对民间环保人士的行动进行 牵制。2012年7月20日,病中的刘福堂被海南警方抓走,理由是“非法经营”。而真正的理由,是他在4月份积极以公民环境记者的姿态,报道了海南乐东县 的莺歌海事件。同样,当自然之友试图对云南铬渣污染案件发起公益诉讼时,发现要想找到相关的法律支持,并不是那么容易,而2012年新修订通过的《民事诉讼法》,把发起公益诉讼的主体,确定为“法律规定的有关机构”,这让民间环保组织发起环境公益诉讼遭遇到了“法院自由裁量”的困境,公益环境律师认为,在绝大多数的情况下,一般法律都会以社会团体、民办非企业不属于“法律规定的有关机构”为由,拒绝立案。


对于信息公开来说,2012年的政策法规有了鲜明的进展。10月9日,环境保护部悄然发出公告,“《中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例》于2008年5月1 日起实施。此前由原国家环境保护总局于2008年1月30日印发的《关于公众申请公开建设项目环评文件有关问题的复函》(环函〔2008〕50号)有关内容与该条例的规定不相符合,现决定予以废止。“细查2008年的那封“复函”,会发现是当时回复给上海环保局的,回复的第一个意见就说:“环境保护行政主管部门在办理环境影响评价审批中获得的由建设单位编制的建设项目环评文件,包括环境影响报告书(表)等,不属于《环境信息公开办法》(试行)所列的主动公 开的政府信息范围”。这意味着,公众向环保部门申请建设项目的环境影响评价文件时,环保部门将必须如实提供,再也无法推诿。

10月30日,环保部发布了《关于进一步加强环境保护信息公开工作的通知》,明确要求“全面落实新修订的《环境空气质量标准》,及时准确发布监测信息。按照《空气质量新标准第一阶段监测实施方案》要求,2012年在京津冀、长三角、珠三角等重点区域以及直辖市和省会城市等74个城市开展监测,12月底前对外发布信息。2013年在113个环境保护重点城市和国家环境保护模范城市开展监测,2015年底前在所有地级以上城市开展监测,并公开信息。完善环境空 气质量信息发布平台,按新标准要求发布监测数据”。

相较之下,2012年中国环保类型的基金会对民间环保的支持能力并未显著提升,甚至有些饱尝申请项目之苦的民间环保团体发出了哀鸣:“基金会,你为什么要欺骗我?” 基金会当然不具备生来就欺骗人的才能,但他们的“资助过程”却由于经常表现出“有心无力”甚至“无心无力”,而备受社会的质疑尤其是需求者的诟病。按照正常的理解,中国的基金会资助模式早过了“审批型”,而早该转为“服务型”,但纵观中国的本土草根基金会在2012年的表现,仍旧属于“傲慢与偏见”兼具一 身的“专制蛮横型”。

简单地分析一下便知。真正合理的资助方式,应当是基金会以敏锐的眼光,迅速发现业内需要以钱来协助的项目或者团队,然后敏捷地凑上去,在最短的时间内判断 项目的资助策略——包括期限、金额、路径等——然后在不超过一个月的时间内,把资助流程走完。这样的服务型资助模式,有两大特点,一是基金会到受资助方办 公室的频率,远大于让资助方到基金会的频率;二是资助的流程极其简短,程序颇为简洁。当然,这考验着基金会资助官员的能力,更考验的是基金会的资助架构。

而中国当前草根型基金会——算起来已经是中国最好的基金会类型了——仍旧执迷于、沉湎于“项目审批”模式不放。这种模式诸多糟糕的缺陷中,“盛气凌人”之 势是最让人受不了的.

这个资助手段更为残忍的地方是,“审批制”必然带来恶性的竞争或者说残忍的拼杀。一个资助方向放出来,上百个上千个上万上项目书在一夜之间同时输送往资助 方的接收邮件。然后,先是预审专家班砍掉百分之五十,然后,是初审专家排出面砍掉百分之五十,然后,是面试专家连砍掉百分之五十,然后,是中审专家营砍掉 百分之五十,然后,是终审专家团砍掉百分之五十,然后,是资助专家旅从剩下的项目中选择出百分之五十。这一场劳心劳力、耗神气费道德的资助过程,漫长到可以与犯人等待判决相比,残酷级别完全类似于战场上的兵刀相见——完全是一次又一次“面对面的杀戮”。

如果资助方无法认识到受资助方才是中国民间环境保护的主角和“明角”,而不愿意让自身潜伏在暗处或者说隐处;如果说资助方无法发现受资助方帮助其把资金花 好的价值,而一再地用怀疑的眼光审视手中流出去的那几个臭钱,那么,中国的草根基金会,可以休矣;那么,中国的民间环保组织,完全可充分利用微博时代、淘 宝时代、手机微信时代、人人都是基金会的时代,开始直接面向公众筹资。

当然,中国民间环保的资助体系绝对不仅仅是资金,虽然资金可能仍旧是当前第一位的需求,但随着中国社会的日益暖化和平民化,法律援助体系、媒体协作体系、 政府协作体系、科技协作体系、陌生志愿者协作体系、医疗协助体系,可能会在未来更强悍地挑战着民间环保工作人员的能力。或者,从这个角度来说,中国民间环境运动的黄金时间正在到来,虽然中国的方式永远出乎人们的预料,但一定会有鲜明的中国自身的特点。

Translated by Jane Luksich

Reviewed by Chris Mirasola

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