Civil Society Regulation and Space in Asia

Discussion Paper for the Roundtable Discussion on Working Together to Address Civic Space in Asia and the Pacific

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This Discussion Paper for the Roundtable Discussion on Working Together to Address Civic Space in Asia and the Pacific briefly seeks to:

- Review the role of civil society in relation to proposed Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” as it applies to a variety of Asian development contexts, and the proposed targets under that goal, identifying positive experiences and trends as well as challenges;

- Analyse the role (positive and negative) played by regulatory environments for civil society in these contexts, including the environment for registration of civil society organisations, reporting obligations and funding restrictions; and

- Propose policy recommendations for different development actors, including UNDP, bilateral donors, international and regional organisations (including civil society networks) and civil society organisations at the national level.

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1 This paper is dedicated to the memory of Martha Farrell, a distinguished Indian CSO leader, activist and teacher who was working with Afghan colleagues on workshops on gender in Kabul when she was killed in a terrorist attack in May 2015. See http://pria.org/blogs.php?action=view&blog_id=2932; http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Kabul-terror-victim-went-where-others-feared-to-go/articleshow/47303268.cms; http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/jun/03/martha-farrell-obituary.

2 I am grateful to Sanjay Agarwal, Barnett Baron, Le Quang Binh, Nick Booth, Oonagh Breen, Chen Yimei, Mathew Cherian, Noshir Dadrawala, Nguyen Thi Bich Diep, Dana Doan, Alison Dunn, John Fitzgerald, Peter Geithner, Nguyen Phuong Linh, Le Mai (deceased), David Moore, Pham Quang Nam, Doug Rutzen, Rajesh Tandon, Nguyen Van Thanh, Le Thi Nham Tuyen (deceased), Iftekhar Zaman, Zhang Ye, Zhu Jiannong, Mary Zurubuchen and many others for many discussions on these issues over the years. My thanks to the UNDP Bangkok Regional Hub for convening this Roundtable Discussion and commissioning this Discussion Paper.
The Role of Civil Society and the Paradox of Civil Society in Asia

The Proposed SDG16 seeks to “Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.”

All of the targets of SDG 16 are relevant for strengthening the role of civil society, and would include civil society as key societal actors in reaching the targets and the goal. But why strengthen civil society toward these ends? SDG 16’s targets include, particularly relevant to the role of civil society, the following among others that could be listed:

“16.3 promote the rule of law at the national and international levels, and ensure equal access to justice for all …

16.6 develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

16.7 ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels

16.8 broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance …

16.10 ens …

16.b promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development….’’

The SDG 16 goal (and other of the SDG goals) cannot be reached without a vibrant, active and creative civil society at national levels. And the specific targets listed above (and others among the SDG16 targets that could be cited) cannot be reached or sustained without the role of civil society.

If these are our goals and targets, as national and regional communities and as an international community, then a strong, active, vibrant and constructive civil society is a crucial step and participant in reaching these targets and goals.

On this, I trust, most or all participants in this Roundtable Discussion would agree.

The current situation for civil society in the countries represented in this Roundtable Discussion – the positive experiences and trends as well as the challenges – are many and diverse. This is, in short, the paradox of civil society in Asia: In many of the countries represented here today, civil society is indeed thriving, at least for some groups. And in many countries – many of the same countries – restrictions and constraints on civil society are growing as well.

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In many of the countries here today – from Myanmar to Indonesia to Vietnam to the Philippines to China and many more – the positive experiences and trends are clear. The number of civil society organizations is growing, and in many countries across the region a wide variety and array of organizational forms are permitted. They are conducting more social service, advocacy and other programmes, and raising more funds to do so. They are (with significant gaps discussed below), participating more in the discussion and formulation of national policies than before.

They are serving more people, and representing broader as well as more defined interests in society. They are, in many of the countries represented here today, able to communicate far more broadly their activities, accomplishments and goals to the broader society. So on one side of the paradox of civil society in Asia, the situation is indeed positive: If we look back thirty years, or fifty years, civil society in Asia today, in most of the countries represented at this Roundtable Discussion, is more active, more vibrant, more representative, and in many countries, civil society can do more.

That is, of course, not the only side of the story. This paradox includes significant negative experiences and trends as well – characterized, in broad headings, but restrictions on the existence, registration, and activities of civil society organizations, and their ability to undertake resource development. Those negative experiences and trends – restrictions on the positive role of civil society – will dominate our discussions in these two days. They are discussed in considerably more detail below.

II. The Role of Regulatory Environments Affecting Civil Society

The regulatory environment is crucial in determining the roles played by civil society and whether the roles and activities of civil society are expanding or under constraint. The regulatory environment is not the only determinant of the vibrancy of civil society, in Asia or beyond, nor does it stand separate from politics, economic developments, and other factors.

But it is – in countries and regions from India to Thailand to Malaysia to Hong Kong to Bangladesh – a key determinant and factor as to whether the role and scope of civil society is rising and falling, and it is the key indicator of which levers, with respect to which kinds of civil society groups, that governments are prepared to use to stifle, constrain and restrict civil society and its activities.

Governments use the regulatory framework to constrain and restrict – or to empower – the civil society sector in many ways. Some of the key regulatory means used in Asia, and the key ones that this Discussion Paper will briefly address, are as follows:

1. Establishment, registration and incorporation requirements for CSOs
2. Prohibited and permitted purposes and activities for CSOs
3. Government supervisory and management requirements and measures vis-à-vis CSOs
4. The legal treatment of foreign organizations and foreign funding
5. The regulatory treatment of CSO resources, including fundraising, CSO economic activities, investment, and related issues

Many other regulatory issues, of course, also significantly affect what CSOs can do in virtually all of the countries represented in this Roundtable Discussion. They include termination and dissolution procedures and a number of other issues. Those are not directly addressed here, in the interest of focusing on some of the key national and region-wide issues that are likely to capture most of the discussion here.

But for those interested in the broader issues, I invite participants to have a look at the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) report that is being launched at the Roundtable Discussion: *The Law Affecting Civil Society in Asia: Developments and Challenges for Nonprofit and Civil Society Organizations* (Sidel and Moore, ICNL, 2015).4 The thinking and drafting that David Moore, I and our ICNL colleagues have done on this Asia-focused report has significantly influenced this Discussion Paper as well.

Additional and usually more detailed discussion of the themes here, and other important regulatory themes for CSOs, can also be found in other ICNL reports, such as the United States International Grantmaking (USIG) country reports,5 the country reports of the NGO Law Monitor series,6 and other detailed resources written and made available by ICNL.7

As an initial matter, as we note in the Asia Report,

> The consistency and clarity of laws remain problematic throughout Asia. That is perhaps to be expected given the enormous diversity of countries, of legal systems, and of approaches to civil society. But both inconsistent laws and ambiguous laws open the door to excessive state discretion in their implementation, weak judicial or administrative oversight of executive implementation, and high costs for CSOs in attempting to comply with inconsistent and vague regulation.

We see these issues throughout the region. In China [and throughout the region], a plethora of laws and regulations govern the nonprofit and civil society sector, ranging from long-outdated regulations on foundations, social organizations and other forms of nonprofits; to new local regulations that in some cases provide more flexibility for both organizations and local governments; to vague and inconsistent provisions concerning tax and other issues. And yet … inconsistent and vague laws and regulations, which enable the state to use wide discretion, also create gaps and possibilities for nonprofits to exist in the gaps of regulation. That, too, is part of the paradox of the Asian regulation of nonprofits and philanthropy.

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4 At ICNL, we are grateful to the Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium and the University of Wisconsin-Madison for their support in the research and production of the ICNL Asia report; to Barnett Baron – a friend and colleague to many at this Roundtable Discussion – for his many years of leadership and guidance in this area and for working with APPC and ICNL to enable the report to be written; and to Margaret Scotti and Mona Qureshi at ICNL for their work on the report.
7 [http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/](http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/).
The paradox here—frequently but not always—is one of textual protection for associational and civil society life and rights, but highly restrictive implementation and wide governmental discretion. That begins with constitutional provisions on freedom of association, assembly, and expression.

As we note in the Asia Report, many countries’ constitutions guarantees freedoms of association, assembly and expression, but state discretion in implementing these freedoms and the lack of mechanisms to enforce these constitutional guarantees profoundly undermine the constitutional protections. This serious problem exists in many other countries around the region—including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, and many others.

In all these countries the broadest protection available for nonprofit and civil society activity is in the constitution, but when translated into more detailed laws and regulations and executive implementation, the freedoms are whittled down via state discretion, restrictive provisions, and lack of redress. Indeed, in a number of countries the constitutional text itself provides explicit rationales for limiting associational freedoms as well as granting them.

Those limits may be based on national security, public order, public morality, national sovereignty, or with many other qualifying phrases. Or they may just be conditioned on such phrases as broad freedoms, limited “in accordance with the provisions of the law” (Afghanistan), “shall be determined by law” (Cambodia) or similar phrases. It can be spectacularly difficult to challenge either these provisions or their implementation, either through judicial means or in the political arena, though recent decisions in the Indonesian Constitutional Court and the Delhi High Court in India have at least taken these issues seriously.

1. Establishment, Registration and Incorporation Requirements for CSOs

A key way in which governments encourage, constrain or engage in differential treatment toward CSOs are the laws and regulations governing the establishment, registration and incorporation of CSOs. There are many issues here, and many ways for governments to restrict civil society. I shall outline some of the key methods of regulation used, with a few country examples; I expect that many more will come out during the Roundtable Discussion on these important matters

(a) Requirements for the establishment of an organization

Law and regulations for CSOs often set out establishment requirements—such as qualifications for the founders of an organization, the minimum number of members needed to establish a group, and other criteria. They may restrict foreigners, non-citizens, minors, stateless people, or other groups from forming groups. They may require the submission of specific documents, such as proof of citizenship, age, residency or other criteria.

We see these kind of establishment requirements at work throughout Asia. These requirements are not per se restrictive, but they can be drafted or enforced in restrictive or arbitrary ways. And there may be no administrative or judicial recourse if they are imposed.
(b) **Registration/incorporation requirements**

As the Asia Report points out, “[i]n direct violation of international legal standards, the laws in several countries in Asia make registration mandatory for associations and sometimes reinforce these requirements with criminal sanctions.” We cite as examples Afghanistan, which requires registration and thus implies that associations cannot carry out activities on an unregistered basis; Kazakhstan, where the creation and operation of unregistered public associations is prohibited; Malaysia, where unregistered groups are prohibited under the Societies Act; Nepal, which also prohibits formation of unregistered associations; and elsewhere.

At the same time, on a positive note, some countries in our region do not have mandatory registration requirements and make registration voluntary, for at least some groups – they include India, Indonesia and Myanmar.

(c) **State agencies supervising the civil society sector**

Here the regulatory environment provides multiple government agencies responsible for managing the civil society sector. And, often, different government agencies regulate and supervise different kinds of organizations, under different laws and regulations. Again, these are not per se discriminatory, restrictive or arbitrary rules, but they may be enforced in that way, and some state agencies may take a highly restrictive and controlling practice toward the civil society sector.

Generally, the key state agencies responsible for registration and/or incorporation include ministries of civil affairs (also often called interior, home affairs, or other terms); ministries of social welfare, development or planning; ministries dealing with particular fields, such as health or education (and usually for nonprofits within those fields); stand-alone registration authorities for nonprofit organizations (a registrar of societies or similar body); company registration agencies; a body within a president’s or prime minister’s office; the governor of a province or state; in some cases the police or security agencies; and other agencies.

As we note in the Asia Report,

two other factors also complicate this picture. One is the *rise of sub-national actors in the registration and incorporation process, particularly at the provincial (state) level*. This has long been a feature of the registration and incorporation process in India, where laws governing societies and trusts make state authorities the key agencies for incorporation and registration for several organizational types. In China, registration of many nonprofit groups that operate in particular provinces is now being decentralized to the provincial level, and even further down in the government apparatus for organizations with even more local activities. In Myanmar, the Association Registration Law of 2014 envisions a decentralized system with registration committees extending from the central to the provincial, district and even township levels. The Law on Associations in Afghanistan of 2013 similarly requires the Ministry of Justice to provide access to registration at the provincial level. Although such decentralized approaches may be laudable for broadening geographic access to registration, they create distinct challenges
regarding the consistency and professionalism of implementation, as local officials may interpret legislation differently or impose ad hoc requirements not based in the law.

The second and a very serious factor is the long-time and increasing role of security agencies in the registration and incorporation process. Within many countries of Asia, security and police authorities have long had a role in registration of nonprofit and civil society groups, including the investigation of applicants and, in some countries, veto powers in the registration process. Those roles may be unwritten or informal, but are increasingly being formalized into law. We see this occurring in Bangladesh, China (for foreign organizations), Myanmar, and a number of other countries. The “securitization” of control over both domestic and international CSOs of various kinds seems to be increasing and quickening in a number of countries.

(d) Registration procedures and processes

Here we have many different processes and models at work throughout Asia. But, as we state in the Asia Report, “[t]oo commonly, registration procedures are highly cumbersome, take significant time and resources for organizations to negotiate, and provide state agencies with wide discretion to deny or delay registration.”

Even within the many different procedures at work, there are some special problems in the registration process. In many countries, registration is a highly cumbersome and very difficult multi-step process, involving multiple steps with several regulators or multiple steps with one key regulator. We see this at work in China (though for some organizations that situation is beginning to improve in some cases), Vietnam, and other countries.

Approval is often required from several regulators – either formal approval by several agencies, or the “passing around” of files by one agency for the views or accession of others. Either way, this makes the registration process very difficult. We see this at work in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and many other countries.

The paperwork can be extraordinarily heavy and daunting. As we note in the Asia Report, “registrants are literally drowned in required documents, seals, approvals, lists, forms and the like.” We see this literally throughout the region.

And yet, as well, in some places there are bright spots. In 2013, Kazakhstan introduced amendments to its nonprofit registration procedures that significantly simplified CSO registration and dissolution processes. In some areas of China, registration has been simplified for some nonprofits, including through a “one stop” system. Registration in India, while as we note in the Asia Report is “sometimes complex and involve[s] significant choice of organizational form and structure, is generally not considered a restrictive or harassing process.”

(e) Grounds for refusal of registration

The grounds for refusal of registration of CSOs in the region vary, as we discuss at length in the Asia Report. But they are often used to restrict or control the registration process and to deny registration to various kinds of groups disfavored by authorities.
Sometimes *technical grounds* are used to refuse registration, and we see that in many countries of Asia. Sometimes *political grounds, public order, the national interest, national security, national sovereignty, national unity, national culture, national customs and other grounds* are used to refuse registration, sometimes -- but not always -- linked to an assumption or charge that particular organizations intend to engage in political activities, lobbying, or other prohibited arenas. Again, these kinds of grounds are at work in many countries of the region, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam, and other countries.

(f) **Safeguards and the ability to dispute refusal of registration/incorporation**

Procedural safeguards and the ability to challenge the decisions of state agencies to refuse registration or incorporation are woefully inadequate in many countries. Many countries have no, or very limited, provisions mandating time limits for government review; automatic registration/incorporation if the executive authority does not act within a certain time; requirement of a written explanation in case of refusal; rights to appeal to administrative and/or judicial bodies; and other safeguards.

And yet, we see the situation for procedural safeguards and the opportunity to challenge decision making beginning to improve – usually very slowly and very fitfully – in some countries. This is, as we note in the Asia Report “the case even in one-party states such as China and Vietnam, where limiting procedural safeguards have been initiated in new or revised regulatory frameworks over time.” Procedural safeguards appear to come in stages, as we describe in much more detail in the Asia Report, often first involving requirements that registration authorities act within a specific time, or that they provide a written explanation in case registration is refused. We saw these initial safeguards in very few countries around the region twenty years ago or even ten years ago; but there are present, and used, in a number of countries now.

The ability to challenge an adverse decision is much more difficult, and less commonly either found or easy to access. As might be expected, we see in more countries of the region the addition of a right to challenge an adverse decision through an administrative process than in the courts. And many countries of the region continue to have no, or virtually no recourse for an adverse registration or incorporation decision.

(g) **Territorial/geographic limitations on registration**

There continue to be, in many countries of the region, territorial or geographic limits on the activities that CSOs can undertake, a significant problem for freedom of association. We note this in many countries of the region, including China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, Turkmenistan, Vietnam, and elsewhere.

2. **Prohibited and Permitted Purposes and Activities for CSOs**

There are a number of ways in which governments limit the purposes and activities in which CSOs may engage. In the Asia Report, we have noted three distinct categories, each usually broadly or ill-defined, and each permitting very wide discretion to government regulators, police
or others to charge or close CSOs, with little or no administrative or judicial or other recourse available. Those broad categories are:

(a) **Restrictions based on national security or public order**
(b) **Restrictions based on political activities, politics, or advocacy, each usually broadly or ill-defined**
(c) **Special substantive limitations on the activities or purposes of CSOs**

Many of the countries represented here restrict the purposes for which a CSO (regardless of form) may exist, or the activities it may carry out, under one or more of these purpose/activity-based broad constraints. Many countries use several!

In the first category – *restrictions based on national security or public order* – we have many countries in the region, including China, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Vietnam, and a number of others.

In the second category – *restrictions based on political activities, politics, lobbying, legislative activities, state ideology, or advocacy* – we also have many countries in the region, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, and others.

And in the third category -- *substantive limitations on the activities or purposes of CSOs* – the countries and limitations tend to vary. For example, the Afghan Law on NGOs prohibits NGO participation in construction projects and contracts. Vietnam and, at times, China, sometimes seek (both through law and enforcement) to prohibit nonprofit organizations from operating in a geographic area where another organization working in the same field is already active.

And in all of these categories, I should note, these purpose and activity-based restrictions usually fall hardest on *advocacy organizations*, such as those working on civil rights, human rights, environmental rights and protection, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, and other such groups. Because of the work that social service groups do, these purpose and activity-based restrictions generally do not fall, or fall only lightly, on these kinds of groups – but they serve as the clearest form of warning, in many countries, as to the advocacy and policy directions that social service groups should not take their work.

3. **Government Supervisory and Management Requirements and Measures vis-à-vis CSOs**

The core of either encouragement or restraint of civil society organizations in Asia and the Pacific is arguably the role of government supervisory and management agencies. If they are facilitative, a vibrant CSO sector can develop. If they are highly constraining, the CSO sector will have a much more difficult time growing and thriving. The methods used by government agencies to supervise and manage the sector differ substantially in different countries – but, we can say in general for the region, that state management is a strong feature of CSO life. And for some countries in the region that is a significant understatement.
(a) **Changes in the mix of supervisory and control agencies**

There are many different features and elements of state supervision and management. *Registered and unregistered groups may be treated very differently*, which unregistered groups subjected to considerably more surveillance and control. Governments may focus on inspecting the programmes of CSOs; their financial, fundraising, commercial and investment activities; the accountability and transparency steps they are required to take, and other supervisory matters.

And the *registration agencies and regulatory agencies may not be the same*, forcing CSOs to deal with multiple agencies that may take different attitudes toward them and impose different formal or informal requirements.

In some countries, we note in the Asia Report, “established and registered groups still report to two supervisory “masters” – a general supervisory authority (such as a ministry of civil, home or interior affairs), and a substantive ministry or agency that guides or approves of their professional and substantive work (such as a ministry of health, education, social welfare, labor, or others). China, for example, has long had the “dual master” system, but is now moving away from that structure for a number of social organizations at local and national levels.”

The *range of regulatory agencies* is as broad as the range of registration authorities discussed above. They include, as we note in the Asia Report, “ministries of interior, home affairs or civil affairs; ministries of social welfare, development or planning; ministries dealing with particular functional fields, such as health, education, labor and social welfare; stand-alone, quasi-autonomous supervisory authorities for nonprofit organizations, such as a Registrar of Societies; company regulatory agencies (particularly for nonprofit companies); a body within a president’s or prime minister’s office; in some cases police or security agencies; and other agencies.”

We are seeing certain developments increase over time. First, *the move from a dual or multiple system of CSO management to a more simplified system by one agency does not necessarily mean a reduction or lightening of government scrutiny or inspection.* It is, as we note in the Asia Report, “more of a risk assessment that dual reporting and supervision is not needed for a wide range of nonprofits.” And here the “securitization” problem rears its head even in societies where the supervision of CSOs has become ostensibly less onerous: Where there are problems, police and security agencies often step into the breach.

Second, as we note in more detail in the Asia Report, “*sectoral ministries (such as health, education, labor, social welfare, urban affairs, rural affairs, and others) seem to be taking on more of the supervisory and regulatory burden* for nonprofits and civil society groups that work within their functional spheres.” This is national policy in many countries of the region these days, although this policy goes back decades for some countries, for example in parts of South Asia.

(b) **Reporting requirements**

Despite changes in supervision and regulatory agencies, reporting requirements have not lightened in many countries of Asia and the Pacific. The *amount and the required timing of CSO
reporting remains cumbersome and daunting for many tens of thousands of CSOs throughout the region, and can lead to termination of CSOs.

We see cumbersome and overly daunting reporting requirements at work throughout the region, for different kinds of nonprofits, in literally too many countries to name, but certainly including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia Nepal, Singapore, and other countries. Advance reporting (in effect, approval of project activities and spending) is required in many countries.

(c) **Enforcement and sanctions**

Many other tools are used as well, and we describe those in considerably more detail in the Asia Report. They include authority to attend internal meetings (Tajikistan); the power to suspend governing board members (in many countries of the region, including Bangladesh for certain groups); the power to intervene in internal affairs (also in many countries of the region, including China, Vietnam and elsewhere).

Beyond those mechanisms, enforcement and sanctions can be applied, as we discuss in the Asia Report, “on a discretionary, inconsistent basis, and often are in a number of countries. [And] sanctions can be applied with draconian force in a number of countries, particularly against organizations that have run afoul of the state for advocacy or political reasons.” Again, we see this in many countries around the region, often applied in ways that are not subject to procedural safeguards, review, or appeal.

In recent years, other areas of law have been used to sanction and target CSOs, especially advocacy organizations. Two key examples are tax law, and information and communications technology regulation. As we note in the Asia Report,

In China and other countries around the region, advocacy nonprofits have been targeted based on minor or esoteric violations of tax law. Information and communications technology legislation has been increasingly used to restrict nongovernmental and civil society activity, or to cause fear of such restriction in future. In Bangladesh, provisions on technology security have been used to target civil society activists, and they have been proposed (through cybercrime legislation) in Cambodia and Pakistan. Civil society organizations and activists in Indonesia have likewise been concerned that the defamation provisions in the 2008 law on electronic information and transactions may be used against them. And Indian groups have lauded the Indian Supreme Court’s declaration that a key section of the Information Technology Act is unconstitutional; that section 66A had been used to harass and arrest civil society activists. In Malaysia, [similar provisions have also been enacted].

Finally, enforcement and sanctions can go beyond even draconian legal norms. As we note in the Asia Report, “[i]n Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Malaysia, and other countries, civil society organizations that undertake advocacy and are regarded as enemies by the government may be subject to harassment that, while formally legal under broad and discretionary statutes and regulations, goes beyond appropriate bounds. This can include extra-judicial surveillance,
overly frequent inspections and demands for documents, harassment of families of staff, detention of leadership, and other methods.” Violence can be and is used as well.

And, as we further note, “[s]ometimes the failure of regulation comes from the other direction – not, for the most part, harassment from government, but a failure of government to provide adequate protection to citizens who are working in or with civil society organizations against the threats and violence meted out to them by non-state actors. This has been a serious problem in a number of countries, including Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines. In each of these states, civil society activists and citizens have been subjected to violence and killings, but governments have appeared unwilling to act to protect citizens and lawful organizations that seek to engage in lawful, constitutionally-protected activities.”

(d) The rise of self-regulation

I would be remiss if I did not mention another element in supervision and management, one that may come as a surprise to some participants in the Roundtable Discussion. That is self-regulation of the nonprofit sector (or areas within it) by the nonprofit sector itself. Why would we even mention self-regulation in the context of government supervision and management of CSOs? In many cases, self-regulation is being used by the nonprofit sector to impose requirements on itself that mirror government mandates (or may even go beyond them), in part to forestall stricter government regulation. In that sense – and while there are also many positive elements to self-regulation – this means that the sector is taking on regulation of itself in place of the state. And that has worrying implications, at least in some countries of the region.

Today the world of nonprofit self-regulation in Asia looks very different indeed than even fifteen years ago. There are “umbrella association rules, codes of conduct, certification mechanisms, accreditation schemes, ranking methods, and many other forms of self-regulation in effect in many of the Asian countries included in this report. India has multiple self-regulation initiatives underway, both for different types of organizations and in different parts of the vast country. Cambodia has seen the emergence of multiple codes of conduct for NGOs and nonprofits, and at least one certification scheme. Even Vietnam, which has a relatively nascent nonprofit sector compared to many other countries in Asia, now has a self-regulatory code drafted by an NGO umbrella group that is intended to strengthen transparency and accountability. Afghanistan, Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines (of longest standing in Asia) and many other countries have self-regulatory codes, models, initiatives and experiments underway.”

Yet, as we note in the Asia Report,

[T]he rapid rise of self-regulatory impulses and initiatives should not be taken to imply a weakening of state regulation. Self-regulation has many motivations – as an educational tool to strengthen nonprofit quality and effectiveness; as a means to try to forestall even stricter government regulation; as a community unifying and bonding device in the nonprofit sector; as a means for self-regulatory entrepreneurs and umbrella groups to extend their influence. But, across Asia, it almost never, at least to date, substitutes for or ameliorates strict government regulation of the nonprofit and civil society community. And rarely if ever [the Philippines being perhaps the only counter-example] does the
government cede any regulatory authority to self-regulatory initiatives; they exist alongside continuing and often tightening government regulation….

4. **The Legal Treatment of Foreign Organizations**

Asian and Pacific governments have always paid special political and regulatory attention to foreign NGOs, funders, some trade associations, bilateral donors, foreign religious groups, and other extra-national groups. This of course relates centrally to the problem of foreign funding, which is likely to be discussed at length in this Roundtable Discussion, what we call in the Asia Report “a long-time focus of political and security attention and regulation for many governments across Asia.” The foreign funding issues are discussed in the next section. But the concern for foreign organizations goes well beyond funding, to their existence and activities within many countries. And it focuses on three key issues: registration of foreign groups; supervision of them and their reporting obligations; and (in the next section of this report) the continuing issues of foreign funding.

(a) **Registration of foreign organizations**

There is a remarkable diversity in provisions for registration by foreign groups, both between countries and often within them as well. As we note in the Asia Report, this ranges

“from the fairly benign and relatively smooth to extremely difficult and burdensome. In Hong Kong, Indonesia, Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, Singapore and South Korea, for example, registration as a foreign organization to carry out most development, relief and poverty alleviation work, while not without burdens, is arguably considerably less burdensome than in other parts of the region. Even in these jurisdictions, however, registration without an approval mechanism is relatively rare; instead, registration typically includes an approval element and often a requirement to identify and enter into a partnership, collaboration and supervision arrangement with a ministry or key local government agency or nonprofit as a prerequisite to registration. In addition, substantive requirements are imposed on foreign organizations in some of these countries; in Singapore, for example, a required number or proportion of board members for the international organization’s local entity must be Singaporean citizens. But other countries present more obstacles to registration as a foreign organization, even one that does not provide or use funding.

Thus there are different levels and burdens of registration requirements throughout the region, including in such countries as Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan and many other states. And this is a dynamic situation, with requirements for foreign groups sometimes changing on a year to year basis, as in China, where a new draft law governing overseas NGOs and other groups has prompted enormous concern in both domestic and overseas communities.
(b) **Supervision of and reporting by foreign organizations**

As virtually every participant in this Roundtable Discussion knows, the supervision of and reporting by foreign NGOs, foundations and other foreign organizations and be highly burdensome, cumbersome and daunting. As we write in the Asia Report,

“[o]rganizations may be required to report any new activities; any new activities with new partners; any new activities in new parts of a country; to report on a quarterly or other very frequent basis; to report in detail and for approval before activities are carried out; to report in detail after activities are carried out; to report to one or multiple state authorities and partners; and/or to report voluminous, highly detailed information at any step in the activity process. On the supervisory side, state authorities may, by virtue of law, have widespread rights to enter foreign institutional premises; inspect or remove papers and data; listen to communications; question local or foreign employees or partners; or carry out other significant supervisory or investigative methods. Sanctions may include fines, detention, arrest and imprisonment.”

These dynamics are at work throughout the region, including most recently in well-known and controversial drafting and enforcement episodes in Cambodia, Pakistan, and China – but certainly elsewhere as well.

5. **The Regulatory Treatment of CSO Resources and Resource Development, including Foreign Funding, Fundraising, CSO Economic Activities, Investment, and Related Issues**

Facilitative or restrictive legal frameworks on the treatment of CSO financial resources and resource development can have a major effect on whether organizations can grow, be active, and develop. Throughout the Asia Pacific region, governments and CSOs have focused on three key areas that constitute the core revenue sources for civil society groups: foreign funding; domestic philanthropic and charitable giving, tax incentives, and fundraising; and income generated by CSO engagement in economic activities. Along with these three key sources is the related process of investment of CSO funds.

Governments have regulated each of these sources and the investment process. As we note in the Asia Report, “[i]f any of these pillars are weakened by legal constraints, the sector becomes vulnerable.”

(a) **Foreign funding**

This is an area of strong regulation in many countries, and is increasing. The flow of foreign funding into Asian countries, including from foreign government-related entities, international NGOs and foundations, corporate programs, and individuals, is subject to increasing scrutiny in many countries in Asia. Certainly the most well-known such scheme is the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act, 2010 (FCRA) in India, which imposes significant limits on the foreign funding that a wide range of Indian nonprofits and political groups can receive, requiring either that recipients secure a place on an approved listing to receive foreign funding and remain
on that list (not an easy task), or secure permission on a case-by-case basis to receive foreign funding (“prior permission”). This regulatory framework has been in place for forty years, and continues to be strengthened.

Similar legislation has been proposed or enacted in other countries as well. As we note in the Asia Report, even where such restrictions on foreign funding are not immediately adopted, the political environment that gives rise to such proposals may have a chilling effect on the receipt of funding or the willingness of donors to undertake work in such countries. We see continuing proposals for more restrictions and more required approval on foreign funding in Bangladesh, China (through an umbrella statute in draft governing foreign NGOs that goes well beyond but includes the foreign funding issue), Nepal, Pakistan, and other countries. And in a number of other countries, such as Malaysia, “governments may [undertake] a demonizing narrative that labels organizations receiving foreign funding … as ‘foreign agents.’”

Yet even here, in the area of regulation that may come in for the most debate and the most focus at this Roundtable Discussion, we are also seeing some states begin to lighten their regulation on foreign funding. This lighter approach can be noted in Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Taiwan, South Korea, and others, with relatively few, if any, restrictions. And so a paradox is at work – some countries are explicitly strengthening their restrictions on foreign funding, while others are beginning to let their foot off that particular restrictive pedal.

(b) **Philanthropic and charitable giving, tax incentives, and fundraising**

I say with confidence that every single participant in this Roundtable Discussion – regardless of country – has noted the rise in charitable and philanthropic giving in their own country and around the region. These domestic sources of giving have become far more important for CSOs than they were even fifteen years ago. As we note in the Asia Report, “[p]hilanthropic communities are growing rapidly – sometimes with extraordinary speed – throughout the region. There are now more than 4,000 private foundations and rapidly increased giving through institutions and online channels in China; a rapidly growing wealthy community with roots in technology, real estate and manufacturing in India; an explosion of giving and philanthropic activity in Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, and other countries of the region; modest increases in Vietnam and Cambodia; new activity in Japan after economic stagnation; and a recovery in giving and philanthropy in South Korea after economic difficulties.” These are just a few countries to mention; many more could be

Governments are responding to the growth in charitable giving and philanthropic activities, but they are almost never keeping up with the diverse means, including new technologies, through which this giving is expanding. Many governments in the region generally support the application of public funds for charitable and public purposes, and seek to encourage such giving and the institutions that support it. So we have seen new, *more facilitative regulation of charitable giving, foundations, trusts, zakat and other institutional forms* in many countries, including Afghanistan, China, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan and many other countries.

*Tax law and tax incentives for domestic charitable giving and philanthropy* have, perhaps understandably, lagged behind, in part because of government caution and in part because
finance ministries and tax authorities are highly reluctant to give up revenue as part of more amorphous national policies to increase charity and philanthropy. Yet even here, there is some slow movement in a number of countries in the region, and some countries, such as India, Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, and others now have tax provisions that do at least begin to seek to incentivize giving.

And gradually, over time, there is beginning to be some movement on an issue that many governments have been highly suspicious of for many years – public fundraising by civil society and nonprofit organizations. For example, new subnational fundraising regulations designed to begin opening up some domestic fundraising have been enacted in over twenty Chinese provinces and major cities – a cautious, controlled, and yet somewhat facilitative approach.

And in many countries, the new, cautious openness to fundraising is also, understandably, paired with more provisions intended to prevent fraud and “sharp behavior” (i.e., manipulating or tricking people, but not necessarily rising to the level of legal fraud) in the fundraising process.

In related processes, many countries around the region are facilitating corporate social responsibility programs and corporate giving, including new tax incentives for corporate philanthropy. A new statute and program in India mandates that certain companies provide certain levels of CSR funding, or explain why they are not doing so, for example.

Yet regulation is also being used – again, often understandably – by governments (as the Asia Report notes)

“to ensure that they can retain regulatory control over the movement of what may become truly large sums of philanthropic capital. So through new laws, new or revised regulations, or policies, they seek to keep some control over the pace of tax incentives; to what degree philanthropic capital may be used beyond social service provision for advocacy or other more sensitive purposes; and other objects of regulation. In some cases, as in India, the government continues to try to mold and channel philanthropic giving by providing special tax incentives for giving to government entities that conduct relief or support non-governmental initiatives, a method that may be gaining some more currency around the region.

(c) **CSO economic activities and investment of CSO resources**

Everyone in this room, I dare say, has experienced, in their country, some debate or controversy about the economic or commercial activities of CSOs. Debates – even major court cases in some countries – on the permissible forms and extent of economic and commercial activity by CSOs have emerged in recent years in Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, the Philippines and Vietnam, and many other countries in the region. As we note in the Asia report, these debates take many local forms, but fundamentally they revolve around two core issues: (1) what range of economic or commercial activity should CSOs be permitted to conduct, and (2) how should the revenues from that activity be treated for tax and statutory purposes?
As everyone attending the Roundtable Discussion knows, traditionally, in most of Asia, CSOs were prohibited from engaging in most economic activity and almost all commercial activity, including, in many cases, fundraising. They operated under strict limits on how they could invest their money (often only through checking or basic savings accounts or through government bonds or government investment vehicles); could not engage either in economic or commercial activity or only in activity very directly related to their nonprofit aim, with all funds generated to be passed through to programmatic activity and not to assets or endowment. In addition, significant tax barriers applied to using the proceeds of economic and commercial activity.

We are now seeing – in fits and starts, often accompanied by significant controversies and loud debates – more room for CSO economic and commercial activities and more flexibility on investment of funds, in many countries of Asia and the Pacific, often expressed through regulatory drafting and amendment.

III. Policy Recommendations for Different Development Actors, including UNDP, Bilateral Donors, International and Regional Organisations (including Civil Society Networks) and Civil Society Organisations at the National Level

How should we think about policy recommendations on reducing restrictions on civic space and regulation?

One approach is to begin with some of the key reforms that should be undertaken in the regulatory arena to begin the process of ensuring that civil society organizations can play appropriate roles in their societies. These reforms would certainly include, in many countries:

- Relaxing restrictions on the formation, registration and incorporation of CSOs
- Permitting voluntary (not mandated) registration by CSOs
- Strengthening the independence and professionalism of registration bodies.
- Making registration and incorporation easier in many ways
- Allowing CSOs to operate across territorial and geographic borders
- Relaxing overly draconian and intrusive state supervision and management of CSOs
- Lifting or significantly relaxing restrictions on foreign funding and cross-border philanthropic flows
- Facilitating domestic charitable and philanthropic giving, fundraising, and gradually increasing the tax incentives for domestic individual and corporate giving
- Facilitating corporate giving and fiscal incentives for that giving
- Facilitating, depending on country conditions and debates, CSO power to engage in economic and commercial activities and wider investment activities for their resources

But even the most cursory reader will note that virtually all of these policy recommendations are recommendations at the country level. That is because the regulatory framework for civic space in Asia and the Pacific is, at root, a matter of national debate, national policy, and national regulation. It can be influenced – substantially influenced, to be sure – by regional and international debates, criticism and competition. But the road to relaxing what appear to be, in many countries, the growing restrictions on civic space and civil society appears to focus on national laws, regulations and policies.
So in these fundamentally national frameworks, what is the role for “different development actors, including UNDP, bilateral donors, international and regional organizations [and trans-border] civil society networks)?” That is perhaps the most difficult set of questions that this Roundtable Discussion faces. We have some good idea of what is needed at the national level, and whether and how fast those policy and legal steps can be taken depends in great measure on domestic factors. But what can UNDP, bilateral donors, international and regional organizations, and trans-border civil society networks to do help facilitate these developments?

My answers can be only general in nature:

These international and regional actors can discuss the international law of freedom of association, assembly and expression, and urge countries to adopt more facilitative regulatory frameworks.

They can provide highly useful resource materials and useful regulatory and policy practice for consideration by individual countries.

These international and regional actors can help link together national CSO groups and networks that are working – struggling – toward a more facilitative regulatory framework for civil society.

They can – very importantly – be certain to include government and even police and security forces in all these efforts, seeking actively to work with them on domestic reforms; they can and should work actively to ensure that government officials, ministries, policy and security agencies do not fall behind these discussions and that they are not ignored in such programming, even when they may be hostile and unresponsive.

These international and regional actors can support the emergence of a domestic academic and policy community that will do its own policy research on a facilitative legal environment for civil society, and play their own roles in domestic debates.

No doubt they can play many other useful roles as well. And, in great measure, the work of this two day meeting is in trying to figure out what useful roles these international and regional actors can play in what are, fundamentally, domestic regulatory policies and measures, domestic debates, and domestic issues within each country in the extraordinarily diverse Asia and Pacific region.